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I. INTRODUCTION
In the world of consumer debt collection in the State of Florida, the
boundaries within which a debt collector may communicate with a debtor in
an attempt to collect a consumer debt are proscribed by both the Federal Fair
1
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Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Florida Consumer Collec-
tion Practices Act (FCCPA).' In order to avoid a lawsuit for improper com-
munication with a debtor, a Florida attorney acting as a debt collector must
comply with the communication provisions of both the federal and state stat-
utes.2 The FDCPA only invalidates state laws dealing with consumer debt
collection if such laws are inconsistent with the federal statute.3 State con-
sumer debt collection statutes that provide more protection for the consumer
than the federal statute are not considered inconsistent for the purposes of
preemption.4
A dilemma exists, however, when the FDCPA meets modem technol-
ogy-the FDCPA "was enacted in 1977," prior to the common usage of an-
swering machines. 5 Thus, the limited types of communication made compli-
ance with the FDCPA's communication restrictions fairly straightforward.6
The technological advances that have occurred over the past three decades,
however, have made compliance with the FDCPA difficult.7 These compli-
ance issues have, "for the most part, . . . been [left] unaddressed by case
law.",8 With answering machines being "used in more than 77 percent of all
[United States] households," debt collectors are unsure as to whether leaving
a message would violate various provisions of the FDCPA. 9 In light of the
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. Shera Erskine has a B.A. in Music from the University of Florida. The
author wishes to thank her mother, Kathy, sister, Reva, fiancee, Marc, and his family for their
continuing love and support. In addition, the author would like to extend special recognition
to her father, Stanley, for his continuing encouragement, guidance, and mentoring. Finally,
the author would like to thank the staff of the Nova Law Review for their dedication and hard
work.
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.785 (2007).
2. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1700.
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
5. Posting of Meghann Marco to The Consumerist,
http://consumerist.com/consumer/fair-debt-collection/is-it-legal-for-debt-collectors-to-leave-a-
message-26681.php (June 7, 2007, 16:36 EST). When the FDCPA was enacted, "[t]here were
no cell phones," fax machines, or e-mails--"[e]ven the telephone answering machine was still
in its infancy." Cindy D. Salvo, Technology and the Law (Debt Collection), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1,
2005, at 5. The FDCPA was "the first consumer protection bill passed by the 95th Congress."
John Tavormina, Comment, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act-The Consumer's An-
swer to Abusive Collection Practices, 52 TuL. L. REv. 584, 584 (1977).
6. Salvo, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Debt collectors are required to provide meaningful disclosure as to their purpose
and identity, however, may not disclose information regarding the debt to a party other than
the debtor, thus creating a dilemma when leaving a message on an answering machine. Id.
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(6) (2000)).
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technological advances, especially in the communication arena, the FDCPA
is "a technological dinosaur that should be updated to include directives
aimed at the new technology."'0  Categorized as "static legislation,"" the
FDCPA is no longer serving its purpose in the rapidly advancing technologi-
cal world. 12
Without any congressional or court directives regarding compliance
with the FDCPA and the recent technological advances, debt collection at-
torneys also face the issue of simultaneous compliance with state law.' 3 The
solution for Florida attorneys, however, may lay in the preemption provision
of the FDCPA. 14 This provision expressly states that the FDCPA does not
preempt any state statute concerning debt collection if that statute provides
more protection for the consumer.' 5 The FCCPA does not explicitly require
a communication from a debt collector to disclose that it is an attempt to
collect a debt, rather requires the debt collector to disclose his or her identity
and purpose only upon being asked to do so.' 6 This appears to provide more
protection for the consumer in the form of upholding their expectations of
privacy by preventing disclosure of private information to third parties. 7
This paper will explore the reasons why Florida attorneys acting as debt
collectors should follow the FCCPA, rather than the FDCPA, because it pro-
vides more protection for the debtor or consumer. Part II of this paper will
10. Salvo, supra note 5. "With recent advances in computer and information technology,
the acquisition and distribution of private information has created new and perplexing privacy
issues. Technology has created these issues faster than the courts are able to address them."
Robert H. Thornburg, Florida Privacy Law: Potential Application of Intentional Tort Princi-
ples and Florida's Constitutional Right of Privacy as Safeguards to Governmental and Pri-
vate Dissemination of Private Information, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 137, 137 (2003).
11. Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection
After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 711, 723 (2006). "The most successful legislative regimes
are open-ended and worded to anticipate future behavior." Id.
12. Id. at 723-24. This could be due to the fact that the FDCPA's purpose is currently to
correct harassment associated with debt collection that "haunted the country's debt-collection
industry before its enactment." Id. at 723.
13. See John H. Bedard, Jr., Update on FDCPA Compliance and Litigation, 61
CONSUMER FfN. L. Q. REP. 25, 146 (2007).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
15. Id. Despite the fact that the Legislature is scheduled to convene in October 2007 to
tackle the anti-technology nature of this statute, their efforts may be delayed by other political
maneuvers such as the "war in Iraq" or the 2008 Presidential election. Caitlin Devitt, The
Mid-Year Washington Outlook; Reviewing the FDCPA Will Be a Major Issue, COLLECTIONS
& CREDIT RISK, June 2007, at 30. At this hearing, the legislature intends to review data collec-
tion practices, including the new communication technology available. Id.
16. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(15) (2007).
17. Id. § 559.72(5). The FCCPA prohibits disclosure of the debtor's information to third
parties without express consent from the debtor. See id.
20071
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discuss the Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc. 18 decision and its effect on
Florida attorneys acting as debt collectors. Part III of this paper will discuss
the underlying purpose of the FDCPA. Part IV of this paper will discuss
exactly what constitutes "communication" within the statutory meaning pro-
vided by the FDCPA. Part V will outline the consumer protections provided
by the FDCPA via its restrictions on communication with the consumer or
debtor in comparison with the protections provided by the FCCPA. Part VI
will discuss the FDCPA's meaningful disclosure requirement and the poten-
tial of infringement of consumer or debtor privacy rights. Part VII will dis-
cuss potential tort liability that attorneys may face in dealing with the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act. Part VIII will briefly discuss how the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act constructively excludes attorneys' use of tech-
nology when practicing under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
how this constructive exclusion may constitute an infringement upon one's
right to earn a living. Part IX will provide the author's conclusion as to why
the FCCPA provides consumers or debtors with more protection than the
FDCPA.
II. THE FOTI v. NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC. DECISION AND ITS EFFECT
ON FLORIDA LAWYERS
A debt collector 9 receives instructions from a client to recover a bal-
ance left unpaid by a debtor.20 In response to these instructions, the debt
collector sends a letter to the debtor followed by two phone calls consisting
of a pre-recorded, standardized message.2' The pre-recorded, standardized
message consisted of a greeting and a request for the debtor to return the
phone call as it dealt with "a personal business matter that requires ... im-
mediate attention., 22 The debt collector was then sued by the debtor for vio-
18. 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due
or asserted to be owed or due another.
Id. In addition, "[a] lawyer who regularly attempts to obtain payment of consumer debts
through litigation or legal proceedings is considered a 'debt collector' under the FDCPA."
Brussels v. Newman, No. 06-61325-CIV-COHN/SNOW, 2007 WL 676189, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 28, 2007) (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292, 299 (1995)).
20. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 647.
21. Id at 648.
22. Id. The exact message was as follows: "Good day, we are calling from NCO Finan-
cial Systems regarding a personal business matter that requires your immediate attention.
[Vol. 32
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lating various sections of the FDCPA, specifically, for a failure to identify to
the debtor that the message was in fact from a debt collector.23
In an attempt to defend against the allegations made, the debt collector
asserted that the messages left on the debtor's answering machine did not
constitute "communication" as defined by the FDCPA. 24 Thus, the debt col-
lector argued that he was not required to provide notice to the debtor that the
message was an attempt to collect a debt.25 The debt collector also attempted
to argue that even if the message was considered a "communication" for the
purposes of the FDCPA,26 that the provision requiring the debt collector to
identify to the debtor that the message was an attempt to collect a debt owed
would "[place] debt collectors in a virtual 'Hobson's choice."' 27  The debt
collector went on to suggest that a debt collector could not simultaneously
comply with the notification requirement of the FDCPA and the provision of
the FDCPA prohibiting any disclosure of information to a third party without
violating either provision. 2' The court disagreed with both arguments pro-
posed by the debt collector, holding that the messages left were "communi-
cations" for the purpose of FDCPA, and thus the debt collector failed to
comply with the notification requirement.29 In addition, the court held that
the debt collector could avoid the issue surrounding disclosure of the deb-
tor's information to third parties by utilizing a debt collection method other
than leaving messages on answering machines.3 °
Please call back 1-866-701-1275, once again please call back, toll-free, 1-866-701-1275, this
is not a solicitation." Id.
23. Id. at 649-50 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1 1)).
24. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 654. "The term 'communication' means the conveying of
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium." 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(2).
25. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).
27. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 658. "Hobson's choice" is defined as "an apparently free
choice when there is no real alternative." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 551
(10th ed. 1999).
28. See Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692e(1 1)).
29. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(2),1692e(l 1)).
30. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 659 ("Debt collectors, however, could continue to use other
means to collect, including calling and directly speaking with the consumer or sending appro-
priate letters."); see also Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (citing Joseph v. J.J. Mac
Intyre Cos., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing how "disclosure to third
parties was 'less likely' in the context of a [message being placed] to a debtor's residence")).
"The collector was 'cornered between a rock and a hard place, not because of any contradic-
tory provisions of the FDCPA, but because the method they have selected to collect debts has
put them there."' Court Rakes Collector Over Misleading Prerecorded Messages, CONSUMER
FIN. SERVS. L. REP., Oct. 18, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Court Rakes Collector] (quoting Leyse v.
2007]
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Following this recent court decision, debt collection attorneys through-
out the country have been faced with whether to leave a message or not-an
issue which the Federal Trade Commission has declined to address. 31 This
refusal by the Federal Trade Commission is surprising because the overall
number of complaints submitted by consumers in regards to harassing debt
collection practices has quadrupled between 2001 and 2006.32 In addition to
the growing number of complaints, the number of debt collectors continues
to grow,33 thus leaving debtors and debt collectors alike confused about the
ability to leave a message in an attempt to collect a debt.
While plaintiff attorneys feel that "[i]t's not difficult for someone who
wants to comply to stay in the straight and narrow,, 34 debt collection attor-
neys feel that it is not so simple, and rather that the "vague and broad lan-
guage" of the FDCPA leaves them especially vulnerable to lawsuits. 35 The
FDCPA seems to "cause[] honest and diligent debt collectors" difficulty in
complying with its ambiguous provisions. 36 Even further, some debt collec-
tion attorneys feel that the abundance of litigation alleging violations of the
FDCPA is a tactic employed by plaintiff attorneys in order "to get their cli-
ents out from under lawful debt-collection activities., 37  Regardless of the
reason behind the increase in litigation against debt collection firms, debt
collectors are left in the dark as to how to keep up with technology without
violating multiple provisions of the FDCPA.38
Corporate Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8491 (DAB), 2006 WL 2708451, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006)).
31. Bedard, supra note 13, at 146-47.
32. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 712. "The Federal Trade Commission ... regularly
receives more consumer complaints about debt collectors than any other industry." Audri
Lanford & Jim Lanford, A Scary New Breed of Debt Collectors and Debt Collection Scams,
INTERNET SCAMBUSTERS, http://www.scambusters.org/debt.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
The Federal Trade Commission received 69,204 complaints related to violations of the
FDCPA in 2006-almost four percent higher than the amount received in 2005. Consumers
Complaining About Wide Range of Issues, Exclusive Analysis Finds, COLLECTIONS & CREDIT
RISK, July 2007, at 12.
33. Lanford & Lanford, supra note 32.
34. Sheri Qualters, Debt Firms Slammed by Consumer Lawsuits, NAT'L. L.J., June 12,
2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 181552737289 (last visited Nov. 3,
2007).
35. Id.
36. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 723.
37. Qualters, supra note 34.
38. See Salvo, supra note 5.
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III. THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT
The purpose of the FDCPA is expressly stated within the statute as be-
ing "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to in-
sure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses."39 "[More]
[s]pecifically, the FDCPA 'prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection
methods, conduct which harasses, oppresses or abuses any debtor, and the
making of any false, misleading, or deceptive statements in connection with
a debt, and it requires that collectors make certain disclosures."' 40 This pur-
pose is justified by Congressional findings that debt collectors were utilizing
"abusive, deceptive, and unfair" practices in their attempts to collect debt.4
Congress further found that these "abusive, deceptive, and unfair" practices
were contributing factors in "personal bankruptcies, [] marital instability, ...
loss of jobs, and [] invasions of individual privacy. ' 42 Thus, the FDCPA was
enacted as a remedial statute,43 based on the additional congressional finding
that the existing laws and remedies at the time were "inadequate to protect
consumers." 44  Thus, "[t]he FDCPA establishes a civil cause of action
against 'any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this
subchapter with respect to any person,"' 45 and allows for parties to enforce
the legislation through private litigation.46
In considering claims under the FDCPA, including claims dealing with
"communications," the court should analyze the claim from the perspective
of the "least sophisticated [consumer]" standard.47 In applying this objective
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000). Apropos to the concept of protecting the consumer,
"[t]he government regulation strengthens the hand of the weaker party, providing in effect the
rules that party would have demanded if it had the bargaining power." Scott J. Burnham,
What Attorneys Should Know About the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or, the 2 Do's
and the 200 Don'ts of Debt Collection, 59 MoNT. L. REv. 179, 183 (1998).
40. Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting
Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV76lORL28DAB, 2006 WL 146208, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
18, 2006)).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).
42. Id.
43. Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b).
45. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (quoting Sakrani v. Koenig, No. Civ. A. 05-1192 (JAG),
2006 WL 20514, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2006)).
46. Burnham, supra note 39, at 183.
47. Brown, 464 F.3d at 453 (citing Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d
Cir. 2000)); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991).
2007]
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standard, the court must analyze "whether a hypothetical least sophisticated
consumer would be deceived or misled by the debt collector's practices."4
The hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer" can, however, be supposed
to possess a basic amount of comprehension about the world. 49 "'The basic
purpose of the least-sophisticated-consumer standard is to ensure that the
FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd."' 50 This
standard has been held to be "consistent with 'basic consumer-protection
principles. "'
The "least sophisticated consumer" standard, while applicable to most
claims under the FDCPA, does not apply directly to FDCPA claims dealing
with the placement of telephone calls by a debt collector without meaningful
disclosure of his or her identity. 2 Thus, courts view these claims from the
viewpoint of "'a consumer whose circumstances makes [sic] him relatively
more susceptible to harassment, oppression or abuse."' 53 This standard is
analogous to the "least sophisticated consumer" standard. 4 Further, when
looking to whether a debt collector has failed to provide meaningful disclo-
sure, the court should look to the context of and the inferences drawn from
the message at issue.55
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES "COMMUNICATION" UNDER THE FDCPA?
In order to invoke the protections provided by the FDCPA, correspon-
dence between the debt collector and the debtor must be considered a
'"communication"' within the meaning set out by the statute.56 The FDCPA
broadly defines "communication" as "the conveying of information regard-
ing a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium."57 In
addition, the FDCPA should be broadly construed because it serves as a re-
medial statute. 8 In interpreting and applying the meaning of legislation,
48. Kuehn v. Cadle Co., No. 5:04-cv-432-Oc-10GRJ, 2007 WL 1064306, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 6, 2007) (citing.Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
49. Id. (citing Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993)).
50. Foi, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 661 (quoting Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318).
51. Brown, 464 F.3d at 453 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131,
136 (4th Cir. 1996)).
52. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing
Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179).
53. Id. at 1110 n.8 (quotingJeter, 760 F.2d at 1179).
54. Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179.
55. Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
56. Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000).
58. Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Blair v. Sher-
man Acquisition, No. 04 C 4718, 2004 WL 2870080, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2004) ("Be-
[Vol. 32
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". [t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare
cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demon-
strably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."'
59
Here, the plain meaning of the term "communication" appears to be
consistent with the underlying purpose of the FDCPA. 60 This apparent con-
sistency, however, has been called into question when the issue of whether a
message left on an answering machine constitutes a "communication" within
the statutory meaning. 6' Even if a message left on an answering machine
does not specifically mention detailed information regarding a debt, that
message still constitutes a "communication" as defined by the FDCPA be-
cause it "indirectly" conveys information about the debt.62 Courts have rea-
soned that such a message is conveying information regarding a debt based
on the underlying purpose of getting the debtor to return the call and discuss
the debt owed.63 Some courts, on the other hand, have recently held that a
communication in which a debt is not specifically mentioned is not a "com-
munication" within the aforesaid statutory meaning.' The lack of judicial
consistency may be due to the statute's "misdirected and poorly drafted"
cause it is designed to protect consumers, the FDCPA is ... liberally construed in favor of
consumers to effect its purpose.").
59. Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
60. Id. (citing Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996)).
61. Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8491 (DAB), 2006 WL
2708451, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006); Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. 8:06-cv-
760-T-24, 2006 WL 1992410, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2006); Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 654-
56; Hosseinzadehv. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115-16 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
62. Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. "15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) applies 'equally to
automated message calls and live calls."' Id. at 1111 (quoting Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos.,
281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2003)) (reasoning that the plain language indicates that
the statutes "prohibit the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure."). In
addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has addressed the issue of contacts in which
the debt collector does not specifically mention the debt and has come to the conclusion that a
communication in an attempt to collect a debt can still violate the FDCPA because the com-
munication "indirectly" conveyed information regarding a debt, "even if the obligation [was]
not specifically mentioned." Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commena-
try on the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,099 (FTC Dec. 13,
1988).
63. Belin, 2006 WL 1992410, at*4.
64. Horkey v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., 179 F. Supp. 2d 861, 868 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (denying
"[p]laintiff's motion for summary judgment" for claim involving defendant's violation of
FDCPA because defendant's contacts did not constitute "communications" within the statu-
tory definition). Additionally, one court has found that a fax was not communication because
it did not convey any information about a debt. Fava v. RRI, Inc., No. 96-CV-629 RSP/DNIH,
1997 WL 205336, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1997). Later courts, however, have avoided
upholding this finding by labeling it as dicta. See Belin, 2006 WL 1992410, at *4.
2007]
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nature, despite the fact that the number of complaints against debt collectors
has decreased since 1970.65
The reasoning behind such a school of thought is based on the notion
that if it were to be construed any other way, it would create a loophole 66
67allowing debt collectors to avoid the disclosure requirement, as well as
other provisions of the FDCPA, by not conveying specific details regarding
the debt.6" Further, courts rationalize that messages left on an answering
machine in an attempt to collect a debt are "intended to initiate further dia-
logue regarding [the debtor's] ... debt, and therefore constitute 'communica-
tions."'' 69 Thus, in a majority of jurisdictions, the restrictions imposed by the
FDCPA apply to all debt collection-related contacts, regardless of whether or
not the debt is specifically mentioned.7
V. THE PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS VIA RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMUNICATION WITH A DEBTOR IN AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT
The primary foundation upon which both the FDCPA and the FCCPA
are premised is the protection of the privacy and reputation of the consumer
or debtor,71 as well as the prevention of harassing debt collection practices.7"
In order to promote the underlying purpose, each statute provides the debtor
with a certain degree of protection.73 Subsection A will discuss the protec-
tion provided by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and subsection B
will discuss the same for the Florida Consumer Credit Practices Act.
A. Protections Provided by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The FDCPA places restrictions upon how, when, and why a debt collec-
tor may contact or communicate with a debtor in order to preserve the deb-
65. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 722-23.
66. Court Rakes Collector, supra note 30. "Under such an exception, debt collectors
would be able to abuse and harass consumers with phone calls and other forms of correspon-
dence so long as there is no express mention of the consumers' debts." Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1l) (2000).
68. Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
69. Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8491 (DAB), 2006 WL
270845 1, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006).
70. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005);
Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commenatry on the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,099 (FTC Dec. 13, 1988).
71. Mathis v. Omnium Worldwide, No. CIV. 04-1614-AA, 2006 WL 1582301, at *5 (D.
Or. June 4, 2006).
72. Foti, 424 F.Supp. 2d at 653.
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (2000); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.785 (2007).
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tor's privacy and reputation, as well as prevent loss of employment.7 4 Spe-
cifically, "[t]he FDCPA regulates a debt collector's contacts with both the
debtor and third parties. 75 As per the FDCPA, a debt collector may not,
without prior consent from the debtor, communicate with the debtor in con-
nection with the collection of a debt "at any unusual time or place" if the
"debt collector knows [that] the [debtor] is represented by an attorney;" or at
the debtor's "place of employment if the debt collector knows... that the...
employer prohibits ... such communication. '76 In addition, "a debt collec-
tor, may not communicate, [in an attempt to collect a debt,] with a third party
... without the prior consent of the consumer, the express permission of a
court, or unless reasonably necessary to effectuate a post-judgment judicial
remedy. ' 77 An attempt to obtain location information about the debtor is the
only exception to the prohibition against third party disclosure. 78  Further,
the FDCPA "expressly prohibits [a] debt collector from mentioning that 'the
consumer owes any debt' and from identifying himself as a debt collector
when he [or she] seeks location information., 79 If a debt collector attempts
to contact a third party in violation of the statute's provisions, such contacts
are considered to be illegitimate collection practices.8"
In addition to the FDCPA's restrictions on who a debt collector can
communicate with,81 the FDCPA requires a debt collector to provide a "mea-
ningful disclosure" of his or her identity.82
74. Mathis, 2006 WL 1582301, at *5.
75. Henderson v. Eaton, No. Civ. A. 01-0138, 2001 WL 969105, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 23,
2001).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1)-(3) (2000).
77. Henderson, 2001 WL 969105, at *1.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b; Mathis, 2006 WL 1582301, at *5. In attempting to collect loca-
tion information, the debt collector may only state that he or she is "confirming or correcting
location information, and may not identify his [or her] employer unless expressly asked to do
so." Mike Voorhees & Sharon Voorhees, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Communi-
cations, and Privacy Issues, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 78 (2004).
79. Henderson, 2001 WL 969105, at *2 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Contacting a
third party for information regarding the whereabouts of a debtor is further limited by the
"one-contact" rule. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 721 n.64. As per the "one-contact" rule, a
debt collector may not contact a third party more than once. Id. "The debt collector is permit-
ted to contact the third party more than once upon the third party's request or if the collector
'reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and
that correct or complete information is now available."' Id. (quoting David A. Schulman, The
Effectiveness of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 2 BANKR. DEV. J.
171, 174 (1985)).
80. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 722.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c.
82. Id. § 1692d(6).
2007]
11
Erskine: Please Leave a Message After the Tone: How Florida Lawyers Should
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA W REVIEW
[T]he "meaningful disclosure" required by section 1692d(6) has
been made if an individual debt collector who is employed by a
debt collection company accurately discloses the name of [his or]
her employer and the nature of [his or] her business and conceals
no more than [his or] her real name. 83
The meaningful disclosure requirement also requires the debt collector
to disclose that the communication is an attempt to collect a debt.84 This
"meaningful disclosure"85 requirement is "often referred to as the [m]ini-
Miranda" warning. 86  The "mini-Miranda' warning" applies to the initial
written communication with the debtor or consumer. 87 If the initial commu-
nication is oral, the warning is required for that communication as well.88
The debt collector must make a proper disclosure in every communication
subsequent to the initial communication. 89 Failure to provide proper disclo-
sure renders the communication a "false, deceptive, or misleading represen-
tation or means" in attempting to collect a debt.9°
Though aimed at protecting the debtor, the "mini-Miranda" warning re-
quirement loses its appeal when left as a message on an answering machine,
able to be overheard by someone other than the consumer or debtor.91
Courts have held that the disclosure requirement is applicable to answering
machine messages despite the risk of disclosure to third parties.92 Courts
83. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quot-
ing Wright v. Credit Bureau of Ga., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 591, 597 (N.D. Ga. 1982)). A debt
collector satisfies this requirement if he or she "disclose[s] enough information so as not to
mislead the debtor as to the purpose of the call." Bedard, supra note 13, at 28.
84. MANUEL H. NEWBURGER & BARBARA M. BARRON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 1.05[2] (2007).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6).
86. Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
87. NEWBURGER & BARRON, supra note 84, 1.05[2].
88. Id.
89. Id. The Sixth Circuit has even held that attorneys must give the requisite warning in
post-judgment communications. Id. (citing Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516 (6th Cir. 1992)).
90. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e) (quotations omitted). A message left on a debtor's
answering machine urging the debtor to call the same day or the next day was deceptive with-
in the statutory meaning, because it "created a false sense of urgency." Court Rakes Collec-
tor, supra note 30.
91. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Check Enforcement, No. Civ. A. 03-2115 (JWB), 2005
WL 1677480, at *8 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005).
92. Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8491 (DAB), 2006 WL
2708451, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006); Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643,
659 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal.
2003)).
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have also avoided providing debt collectors with the appropriate means to
utilize the answering machine technology without violating at least one pro-
vision of the FDCPA.93 In essence, the courts have cut off an efficient tech-
nological avenue while simultaneously blaming the FDCPA's inadequacies
on the debt collectors. 94 Thus, a gap exists in the FDCPA's protections be-
cause it is unlikely that debt collectors will stop using available technology. 95
It is thus up to the legislature to fill this void.96
B. Protections Provided by the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act
The Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) 97 "is a reme-
dial statute ... designed to prohibit certain conduct." 98 The FCCPA allows a
debtor99 to bring an action against "any person"1 0 who violates any provi-
sion of the FCCPA. '01 Courts have interpreted the broad "any person" lan-
guage of the FCCPA to permit a debtor to sue "persons generally,"' 2 includ-
93. See Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 659 n.26; Bedard, supra note 13, at 147; Salvo, supra
note 5.
94. Bedard, supra note 13, at 147.
95. The new technologies available, such as sophisticated "phone systems and computer
software," make it inefficient for a debt collector to adhere to the historical door-to-door
means of debt collection. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 729-30.
96. Cox Communications has reported that eighty to eighty-five percent of their out-
bound collections calls end up as voicemail messages. VMS Makes a Quiet Entrance,
COLLECTIONS & CREDIT RISK, Sept. 2004, at 22. [hereinafter VMS]. But, as stated by Judge
Deborah A. Batts, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, "[t]he Court has no
authority to carve an exception out of the statute just so [a debt collector] may use the tech-
nology they have deemed most efficient." Court Rakes Collector, supra note 30 (quotations
omitted).
97. FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.785 (2007).
98. Campbell v. Providian Nat'l Bank, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 644a (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct.
2007) (citing Harris v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Jacksonville, 338 So. 2d 196, 200 (Fla. 1976)).
99. The FCCPA defines a "debtor" as "a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated
to pay a debt." FLA. STAT. § 559.55.
100. See FLA. STAT. § 559.72. "The prohibited practices contained in the FCCPA do not
apply just to collection agencies and debt collectors. Section 559.72 [of the Florida Statutes]
mandates [that] 'no person' shall engage in the prohibited activities." Fla. S. Comm. on Judi-
ciary, CS for SB 94 (2001) Staff Analysis 2 (Mar. 6, 2001).
101. Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. 8:06-cv-760-T-24, 2006 WL 1992410, at *7
(M.D. Fla. July 14, 2006). The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc.,
88 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2000). "The strict liability view of the [FDCPA] is
supported by a closer examination of the FDCPA itself." Id. at 1362. Unlike the FDCPA, the
FCCPA "requires an allegation of knowledge or intent by the debt collector in order to state a
cause of action." Id. at 1363.
102. Cook v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 332 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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ing corporations, °3 businesses, °4 and law firms.' °5  Further, the FCCPA
continues to be updated and amended by the legislature-unlike the
FDCPA-in ways which provide additional protection for the debtor.'06 One
possible reason as to why the updates to the FCCPA continue to provide sig-
nificant protection is that the FCCPA is much "narrower in scope than" its
federal counterpart. 1
07
Similar to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the FCCPA prohibits
disclosure of information regarding the debt to anyone other than the debtor
or his or her family. 10 8 In order to state a valid cause of action for violation
of this provision, a debtor need only show "that there was a disclosure of
information to [someone] other than" the debtor or his or her family; "that
such person [did] not have a legitimate business need for the information;
and... that such information affected the debtor's reputation. '  Courts are
very strict with this provision in that a debt collector cannot even disclose
information to an intimate friend cohabiting with the debtor. 110
Also similar to the FDCPA, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices
Act prohibits communications so frequent in nature that they constitute har-
assment. "' Specifically, the FCCPA makes it a violation to:
103. Id. "The word 'person' includes individuals, children, firms, associations, joint ad-
ventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corporations, and
all other groups or combinations." FLA. STAT. § 1.01(3) (2007).
104. See Williams v. Streeps Music Co., 333 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that defendant music store violated a provision of the FCCPA by attempting to col-
lect a debt that had already been satisfied).
105. Sandlin v. Shapiro & Fishman, 919 F. Supp. 1564, 1570 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (holding
that a law firm was considered a "debt collector[] under the FDCPA"). Courts have also
applied this section to automobile finance companies. Schauer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 819 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). A company "in the business of
repossessing vehicles, however," did not fall within the parameters of the statute. Seibel v.
Society Lease, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 713, 716 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that absent evidence of
company contacting debtors or being assigned any debts, company did not fit within statute's
meaning).
106. Dale T. Golden, Florida Legislature Considers Changes to Debt Collection Law,
DEF. DIG., Mar. 2005,
http://www.marshalldennehey.com/CM/DefenseDigest/DefenseDigest286.asp.
107. See Cooper v. Litton Loan Servicing, 253 B.R. 286, 290 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000).
108. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(5) (2007).
109. Heard v. Mathis, 344 So. 2d 651, 655 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
110. Id. at 654. The meaning of the word "family," however, "has been extended beyond
marital or blood relationships to include families 'in fact."' Id. To qualify as a family "in
fact," the homestead must consist of "(1) [a] legal duty to maintain arising out of the relation-
ship [or] (2) a continuing communal living by at least two individuals under circumstances
where one is regarded as the person in charge." Id.
111. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(7).
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[w]illfully communicate with the debtor or any member of her or
his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to
harass the debtor or her or his family, or willfully engage in other
conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the
debtor or any member of her or his family. 1
12
Courts have further held that communication with a debtor regarding
the debt which has passed the point of negotiation or persuasion constitutes
harassment within the statutory meaning. 113
Unlike its federal counterpart, the FDCPA only requires a debt collector
to disclose his or her purpose and identity when asked to do so.114 Specifi-
cally, the statute makes it a violation to "[r]efuse to provide adequate identi-
fication of herself or himself or her or his employer or other entity whom she
or he represents when requested to do so by a debtor from whom she or he is
collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt."'1 5 This allows debt
collectors to utilize available technology while still protecting the privacy
and reputation of the debtor-the risk of third party disclosure via an answer-
ing machine would no longer exist. From this perspective, the FCCPA per-
mits the use of available technology without compromising the protection of
the debtor's privacy or reputation.
VI. POTENTIAL PRIVACY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT'S "MINI-MIRANDA" WARNING REQUIREMENT
By requiring debt collectors to provide a "meaningful disclosure,"'1 6 the
"mini-Miranda" warning requirement of the FDCPA yields a number of po-
tential privacy issues. Specifically, there is a high risk of disclosure of in-
formation to a third party when a debt collector opts to use an answering
machine as a means of contacting a debtor.117 This is especially true since a
large number of debtors are college students living with a roommate. 18
112. Id.
113. Story v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 343 So. 2d 675, 677 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
114. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(15).
115. Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) (2000).
117. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Check Enforcement, No. Civ. A. 03-2115 (JWB), 2005
WL 1677480, at *8 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005). "[T]he Court acknowledges that disclosure during
an automated call could compromise the debtor's privacy if another party such [as] a neighbor
or relative inside the home picks up the debtor's phone and hears the automated call." Joseph
v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163-64 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
118. Seventy-two percent of college freshmen have a credit card. NELLIE MAE,
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS IN 2004 4 (2005), available at
http://www.nelliemae.com/pdf/ccstudy.2005.pdf. In 2004, the average credit card debt for
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In Federal Trade Commission v. Check Enforcement,"9 the court held
that messages left by a debt collector on the debtor's home answering ma-
chine were a violation of the FDCPA. 120 The court found that the messages,
which were attempts to obtain payments from an alleged debtor, were over-
heard by family members of the debtors and other third parties. 2'1 Because
there is no way of knowing whether the "debtor will answer the phone," 122
the chance of violating the federal statute is high. In order to violate the pro-
hibition against third party disclosure provision of the FDCPA-and thus
invade the privacy of the debtor-communication need only be "'in connec-
tion with the collection of any debt."",1
2 3
The Florida Constitution sets forth a much broader right to privacy than
that set forth in the Federal Constitution.12 "Florida's right to privacy 'em-
braces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the individual
in those interests, than does the Federal Constitution.""'2 5 "Florida is one of
only a handful of states wherein the state constitution includes an independ-
undergraduate students was $2,169, with seven percent of undergraduate students carrying a
debt of $7,000 or more. Id. at 7-8. For Florida debt collectors, a large number of debtors are
undergraduate college students based on the fact that seventy-eight percent of undergraduate
students in the southern region of the United States carry credit cards, with sixteen percent of
those students carrying a balance between $3,000 and $7,000. Id. at 10. Including under-
graduate college students, the number of unmarried households-which includes unrelated
persons such as roommates-has steadily increased. Thomas F. Coleman, Unmarried House-
holds in the United States, UNMARRIED AMERICA, Sept. 12, 2007,
http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/Census_ 1990-2001/unmarried-majority-table.htm. In
Florida, 52.1% of households were unmarried as of 2005. Id. This number leaves debt collec-
tors with difficulty in determining who will actually be listening to any given answering ma-
chine message. The risk of disclosure to a third party is especially great when multiple
roommates share an answering machine:
[T]he way our voicemail was configured, one had to listen to a message in its entirety to get to
the next message or to save a message. The only way you could cut a message short was to
erase it. So I ended up having to listen to the messages and then saving them for my room-
mate.
Posting of ACAMBRAS to The Consumerist, http://consumerist.com/consumer/fair-debt-
collection/is-it-legal-for-debt-collectors-to-leave-a-message-26681.php (June 7, 2007, 16:58
EST).
119. No. Civ. A. 03-2115 (JWB), 2005 WL 1677480, at *1.
120. Id. at *8.
121. Id.
122. VMS, supra note 96. If the debtor is not the person answering the phone, the debt
collector placing the call risks violating FDCPA provisions. Id.
123. Henderson v. Eaton, No. Civ. A. 01-0138, 2001 WL 969105, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 23,
2001) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)(2000)).
124. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Palm Beach v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 585, 588 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001) (citing Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1985)).
125. Id. (quotinglnreT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)).
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ent, freestanding Right of Privacy Clause." 126 The Florida Constitution ex-
plicitly grants "Floridians the right of privacy."' 127  Under this right of pri-
vacy, each person has a "right to 'determine for themselves when, how and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.""' 128 This
explicit grant of privacy, however, only protects Floridians from governmen-
tal intrusion, as does the Federal Constitution. 129  In applying it to the
FDCPA's "mini-Miranda warning," on the other hand, a debtor could argue
that the provision was enforced by a state or federal judge-either of which
is considered to be a state actor. 130 A state actor, such as a judge, enforcing
an unconstitutional statute constitutes governmental action.'' An action
against a state official to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional fed-
eral statute is a viable cause of action. 1
32
Thus, in applying the right of privacy to the FDCPA's "mini-Miranda"
warning requirement, this provision could pose a variety of claims against
the government, as well as attorneys. The "mini-Miranda" warning, being
enforced by courts, contradicts one of the FDCPA's underlying purposes-to
protect the debtor's privacy.'33
126. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 206 (Fla. 2007) (quoting N. Fla.
Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 634 (Fla. 2003)).
127. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Johnson, 959 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
128. Id. (quoting Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1989)).
129. Sparks v. Jay's A.C. & Refrigeration, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1433, 1441 (M.D. Fla.
1997). "The United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize a general, constitutionally-
protected right of privacy." Thomburg, supra note 10, at 140-41.
130. People v. Garberding, 787 P.2d 154, 156 (Colo. 1990) ("State judges are ... actors
within the meaning of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment."); Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 689 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 2007) ("[T]his case involves state action by the
federal government.").
131. Fla. Dep't. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982).
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar all claims against officers of the State, even when di-
rected to actions taken in their official capacity and defended by the most senior legal officers
in the executive branch of the state government.... [Aln action brought against a state official
to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute is not a suit against a State barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at 684.
132. See Crespo, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 689 n.7. "[T]he Court will review the ... claims
under the Fifth Amendment because this case involves state action by the federal government.
enforcing... a federal statute." Id.
133. See Tavormina, supra note 5, at 590. "These communications constitute unwarranted
invasions of the consumer's privacy .... " Id. The FDCPA's provisions prohibiting disclo-
sure of a debt to third parties was intended to prevent unnecessary loss of jobs as well as pro-
tect against "serious invasions of privacy." Pearce v. Rapid Check Collection, Inc., 738 F.
Supp. 334, 337 (D.S.D. 1990) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-382 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699).
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VII. POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT'S "MINI-MIRANDA" WARNING REQUIREMENT
"The Supreme Court of [Florida] has recognized the right of privacy as
a ... tort" in addition to a constitutional guarantee. 134 Generally, where the
right to privacy is recognized, the "oppressive treatment of a debtor" in an
attempt to collect a debt may constitute "an invasion of privacy."'135 In addi-
tion, "oral communication ... accompanied by sufficient publicity" can cre-
ate a cause of action for invasion of privacy. 36 "'In some torts the entire
injury is to the peace, happiness or feelings of the plaintiff .... "" ' The
FDCPA "was enacted [in order] 'to eliminate abusive debt collection prac-
tices' which 'contribute to ... invasions of individual privacy."' 138 Thus, if
required to adhere to the "mini-Miranda warning," debt collection attorneys
may open themselves up to pendent state law claims concerning the privacy
of the debtor in addition to undermining the purpose of the FDCPA. 1
39
Part A of this section will discuss public disclosure of a debt as an inva-
sion of privacy, and part B of this section will discuss the tort of intrusion
upon an individual's seclusion.
A. Public Disclosure of a Debt as an Invasion of Privacy
Unreasonable publicity given to a private debt has generally been "rec-
ognized as an actionable invasion of the debtor's right of privacy." 140 Courts
have held that a debtor has a valid cause of action where a debt collector has
placed "calls to the debtor's relatives or neighbors.'' 4. The extent of the
134. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 10-11 (5th Cir. 1962)
(citing Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1944)).
135. Id. at 11.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 184 S.E. 452, 454
(Ga. Ct. App. 1936).
138. Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1991) (quot-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), (e) (2000)).
139. Mullins v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 07-cv-00397-RPM-PAC, 2007 WL 1795871, at *1 (D.
Colo. June, 21, 2007).
140. J.L. Litwin, Annotation, Public Disclosure of Person's Indebtedness as Invasion of
Privacy, 33 A.L.R. 3D 154, 156 (1970); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). "A
person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his
affairs known to others ... is liable to the other." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867. The tort of
invasion of privacy "has generally been more successful for debtors than.. . the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm." DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER
CREDIT AND THE LAW § 13:4 (2007).
141. Litwin, supra note 140, at 156.
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publicity, even via oral communication, determines whether the debtor has a
cause of action for invasion of privacy. 14 2 In Florida, all communications
accompanied by sufficient publicity are sufficient to support a debtor har-
assment case. 143  In addition, a creditor is liable for invasion of privacy
where he or she has divulged information about the debt to one who had no
legitimate interest in the information. "
A number of states have ruled that an oral declaration can constitute an
invasion of one's privacy. 145 In particular, Florida courts are split on this
concept. 146 In other states, courts have reasoned that "the oral publication of
a private matter with which the public has no proper concern may be just as
devastating and damaging as a written communication."'
' 47
"A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's in-
terest in not having his [or her] affairs known to others . . . is liable to the
other."' 48 This rule protects an individual's interest in living with some pri-
vacy. 149  This tort is particularly applicable to the "mini-Miranda" warning
insofar as "liability exists . . . if the defendant's conduct was such that he [or
she] should have realized that it would be offensive to" a reasonable per-
son. '50 In order for an action for invasion of privacy to be viable, there must
have been a disclosure of private information.' 5 ' Private information in-
cludes an individual's "financial dealings"5 2 or "debts."' 53 Public disclosure
142. Id. at 157.
143. Id. at 165.
144. See id. at 156.
145. I.J. Schiffres, Annotation, Invasion of Right of Privacy by Merely Oral Declarations,
19 A.L.R. 3D 1318, 1321-22 (1968).
146. See Sacco v. Eagle Fin. Corp. of N. Miami Beach, 234 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1970) (recognizing communication of insults to public regarding debt as possible
invasion of privacy); Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir.
1962) (recognizing that an oral communication could invade a person's right to privacy if
"accompanied by sufficient publicity" of such communication); but see Cason v. Baskin, 20
So. 2d 243, 252 (Fla. 1944) ("mere spoken words cannot afford a basis for an action based on
an invasion of the right of privacy").
In order to constitute an invasion of the right of privacy, an act must be of such a nature as a
reasonable man can see might and probably would cause mental distress and injury to anyone
possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence, situated in like circumstances as the complain-
ant; and this question is to some extent one of law.
Cason, 20 So. 2d at 251.
147. Schiffres, supra note 145, at 1322 (quoting Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v.
Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Mo. 1959)).
148. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
149. See id.
150. Id. Thus, a cause of action only exists when the defendant knew or should have
known of the offensive nature of his or her act. Id.
151. Id.
152. Mason v. Williams Disc. Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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includes oral communications. 114 While public disclosure usually requires
communication to a large number of persons, such disclosure can also occur
where one merely initiates the process of the information eventually being
disclosed to a large group of people. '55
Generally, "[c]ommunication regarding a debt" to a third person-
including the debtor's family--"is... found to be an invasion of the debtor's
privacy."
156
B. Intrusion upon an Individual's Seclusion
Because Florida's Constitution explicitly does not provide for protec-
tion against the unauthorized distribution of private information by private
entities, 57 courts have identified four privacy torts in order to protect the
citizens of Florida. 158 The four privacy torts recognized by the State of Flor-
ida include: "1) the misappropriation of an individual's name or likeness; 2)
the intrusion upon an individual's seclusion; 3) the right of publicity; and 4)
false light invasion of privacy."'' 9 Out of the four recognized privacy torts,
"the ... intrusion upon [an individual's] seclusion" is most applicable to the
FDCPA's potential privacy issues. 1
60
To establish a claim for the intrusion upon seclusion theory of invasion
of privacy, a debtor must prove three separate elements: "1) an intentional
intrusion, physical or otherwise, 2) upon the plaintiffs solitude or seclusion
or private affairs or concerns, 3) which would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person."'' This particular tort is aimed at "protecting the privacy
surrounding the activities inside the home."' 162 The tort of intrusion upon
153. Challen v. Town & Country Charge, 545 F. Supp. 1014, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see
also Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941).
154. Schiffres, supra note 145, at 1322.
155. See Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 322 (Ala. 1961).
156. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 140, § 13:4 (citing Norris, 132 So. 2d at 325); see
also Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So. 2d 439, 444 (La. Ct. App. 1968); La Salle
Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 253 N.W. 424, 426 (Neb. 1934)).
157. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
158. Thornburg, supra note 10, at 138 (citing Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250-51
(Fla. 1944)). The four torts recognized by Florida courts can be traced to "The Right to Pri-
vacy, an infamous Harvard Law Review article written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis." Id. at 141.
159. Id. at 141.
160. Id. at 149. "The tort of intrusion upon seclusion has been recognized as the privacy
tort most directly available to protect an individual's basic right 'to be let alone."' Id.
161. Hilburn v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., No. 06-6096-HO, 2007 WL 1200949, at
*4 (D. Or. Apr. 19, 2007) (quoting Mauri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 310 (Or. 1996)).
162. Thornburg, supra note 10, at 150.
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seclusion "'requires proof of an actual invasion of 'something secret, se-
cluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff .... "',"'
Intrusion upon seclusion "consists of a collector's interference with a
debtor's interest in solitude or seclusion."'" When telephone calls to a deb-
tor become "'repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a
course of hounding the [debtor], . . . privacy is invaded."""5 Further, courts
have held that a message left with debtor's sister-in-law and wife constituted
a "wrongful intrusion" invasion of privacy. 166 In applying the "intrusion
upon seclusion" tort to debt collection,
[t]he mere efforts of a creditor ... to collect a debt cannot without
more be considered a wrongful and actionable intrusion. A credi-
tor has and must have the right to take reasonable action to pursue
his [or her] debtor and collect his [or her] debt. But the right to
pursue the debtor is not a license to outrage the debtor. 1
67
One court has further held that a single call made to a debtor in an at-
tempt to collect a debt may constitute an invasion of privacy by intrusion
upon one's seclusion.'68
VIII. THE CONSTRUCTIVE EXCLUSION OF TECHNOLOGY FROM METHODS
AVAILABLE FOR DEBT COLLECTORS TO COLLECT DEBT MAY CONSTITUTE
INFRINGEMENT UPON ONE'S RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING
"The right to work, earn a living and acquire and possess property from
the fruits of one's labor is an inalienable right."' 169 The Florida Constitution
163. Id. (quoting Nelson v. Me. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977).
164. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 140, § 13:4.
165. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). One court has held
that repeated phone calls to a debtor's workplace disturbed the debtor's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and therefore instilled liability upon the debtor for invasion of privacy. Kuhn
v. Account Control Tech., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1443, 1448-49 (D. Nev. 1994).
166. Cartwright v. Tacala, Inc., No. CIV A 99-W-663-N, 2000 WL 33287445, at *15
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2000) (citing Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 324-25 (Ala.
1961)).
167. Jones v. U.S. Child Support Recovery, 961 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (D. Utah 1997)
(quoting Norris, 132 So. 2d at 323).
168. Diaz v. D.L. Recovery Corp., 486 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The court
reasoned that "the important point [of the tort] is not that the intrusions be persistent, but that.
. [they] rise to the level of 'highly offensive' to a reasonable person. Id. at 480; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
169. Lee v. Delmar, 66 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1953). To illustrate, a court has found that a
real estate resolution prohibiting a real estate broker to employ any real estate salesman who
worked a second job was unlawful. Id. at 254.
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provides that citizens have an inalienable right "to be rewarded for [their]
industry."'70 Therefore, the right to earn a living is recognized in Florida as a
fundamental right."'7 Where one is negatively impacted by a rule restricting
his or her profession an injury in fact exists. 172 Statutes which restrict "the
right to earn a living" pose a serious threat to due process. 173 Thus, the
"mini-Miranda" warning provision of the FDCPA, which essentially prohib-
its the use of answering machines, negatively impacts debt collectors and
therefore an injury in fact exists. 17
IX. CONCLUSION
Simultaneous compliance with both the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act is near impossible for
Florida debt collectors, keeping in mind the technological advances which
have occurred since the creation of the FDCPA. 17  Specifically, the "mini-
Miranda" warning is clearly at odds with not only the technological ad-
vances,176 but with the remainder of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
as well. 17' The only answer for Florida debt collectors-until the FDCPA is
updated with technology in mind-is utilizing the preemption provision of
the FDCPA.'78 The FDCPA explicitly states that it does not preempt any
state collection law which affords the consumer greater protection. 179
Because federal courts in a variety of states 80 have held that a message
left on an answering machine is a "communication" within the statutory
meaning,' 8 ' debt collectors must properly disclose their identity when leav-
170. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
171. Id. "All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law, and have
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue
happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property ..... Id.
172. Ward v. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 651 So. 2d 1236, 1237
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). "A real and sufficiently immediate injury in fact has been
recognized where the challenged rule or its promulgating statute has a direct and immediate
effect upon one's right to earn a living." Id.; see also Jacoby v. Fla. Bd. of Med., 917 So. 2d
358, 360 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Fla. Med. Ass'n, Inc. v. Dep't. of Prof I Reg.,
426 So. 2d 1112, 1113-14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
173. Callier v. Dir. of Revenue, 780 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. 1989) (Blackmar, C.J., dissent-
ing).
174. See Ward, 651 So. 2d at 1237.
175. See Thornburg, supra note 10, at 137.
176. See id.
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000).
178. Id. § 1692n.
179. Id.
180. See cases cited supra note 30.
181. Hosseinzadeh v. MR.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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ing a message. 82 With the growing number of people living with persons
other than their "family,"' 83 the chances of disclosing private financial in-
formation to a third party is nearly inevitable.' 84 The reality of this risk
opens debt collectors up to a variety of federal and pendent state law
claims. 185 Debt collectors may be left vulnerable to invasion of privacy
claims, 86 as well as actions for violation of the FDCPA provision prohibit-
ing disclosure to third parties. 187
Debt collectors are not the only ones left vulnerable by the "mini-
Miranda" warning requirement; 188 the government may be subjected to
claims for invasion of privacy, as well. 189 Judges are state actors, 190 and a
state actor enforcing a statute which invades the privacy of a citizen is a vio-
lation of both the Florida and United States Constitutions. 191
Not only does the "mini-Miranda" warning open debt collectors up to a
variety of liabilities, and place the government in a difficult situation, it less-
ens the protection to the consumer, as well. With the disclosure requirement
in place, consumers now have no control over who may be informed of their
financial situation, especially with the utilization of new technologies. With
the potential for disclosure of private financial information, consumers are
left in a bad situation.' 92 The FCCPA, unlike the FDCPA, does not require
disclosure of a debt collector's identity unless requested by the consumer. 193
This gives the consumer more control over the disclosure of information
without infringing upon the debt collector's ability or right to earn a living.
This solution leaves everyone in a "win-win" situation.
In conclusion, Florida debt collectors should adhere to the FCCPA dis-
closure requirement when attempting to collect a debt because it provides
182. NEWBURGER & BARRON, supra note 84, 1.05[2].
183. Coleman, supra note 118.
184. See Mason v. Williams Disc. Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
see also Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 322, 325 (Ala. 1961).
185. See, e.g., Mullins v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 07-cv-00397-RPM-PAC, 2007 WL 1795871,
at *1 (D. Colo. June, 21, 2007).
186. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 10-11 (5th Cir. 1962)
(citing Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250-51 (Fla. 1944)). The right to privacy claims
include four distinct privacy torts, namely intrusion upon one's seclusion. Thornburg, supra
note 10, at 138, 141 (citing Cason, 20 So. 2d at 250-51).
187. Henderson v. Eaton, No. Civ. A 01-0138, 2001 WL 969105, at *1, *3 (E.D. La. Aug.
23, 2001).
188. See NEWBURGER & BARRON, supra note 84, 1.0512].
189. Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 689 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
190. People v. Garberding, 787 P.2d 154, 156 (Colo. 1990).
191. See Crespo, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 689 n.7.
192. See Mason v. Williams Disc. Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
193. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(15).
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consumers with more protection, thus avoiding the FDCPA preemption pro-
vision.
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